INTRODUCTION
In Takings and Distributive Justice,1 I proposed a progressive in terpretation of the Compensation Clause. In his response, published in this issue,2 Professor Lunney challenges the plausibility and the desir ability of my interpretation and proposes an alternative. This Essay compares our approaches. It concludes that Professor Lunney's care ful examination of the public choice analysis of takings does refine my theory. Contrary to Professor Lunney's claims, however, these refine ments reinforce -rather than undermine -the viability of a progres sive takings doctrine.
Parts I and II set the stage by summarizing the principal claims made, respectively, in my original Article and in Professor Lunney's response. Parts III and IV constitute the core of this Essay, vindicating both the plausibility and the normative desirability of my proposed doctrine. Part V provides two examples. A brief conclusion follows.
I. A PROGRESSIVE TAKINGS LAW
In Takings and Distributive Justice, I claimed that takings law can accommodate the ideals of social responsibility and equality, and ar gued against the conventional wisdom that a relaxed regulatory tak ings doctrine -one that seeks to minimize the occasions of compen sating owners due to governmental regulation of their assetspromotes these ideals. 3 By reconceptualizing two familiar tests in tak ings jurisprudence -reciprocity of advantage and diminution of value -I proposed a more refined test for distinguishing a taking from a regulation with a view to both civic virtues and egalitarian concerns.
Finally, I suggested that, rather than radically transforming the current law, my theory provides a doctrinal vocabulary and normative under pinnings for understanding a significant segment of the already-extant takings jurisprudence.
The premise of a progressive approach to takings law is that own ership is not merely a bundle of rights, but also a social institution that creates bonds of commitment and responsibility among owners and others affected by the owners' properties. Furthermore, property is an expression of a cluster of values -primarily privacy, security, and in dependence -each of which necessarily entails the distribution as well as the retention of wealth. Property necessarily entails distribu tion since ownership is a source of economic and, therefore, social, political, and cultural rights and powers, the correlatives of which are other people's duties and liabilities. 4
Takings and Distributive Justice maintained that a progressive takings doctrine, committed to social responsibility and egalitarian concerns, must not -contrary to some conventional wisdom -be too oblivious to the imposition of disproportionate burdens in the pur suit of public actions. A relaxed takings doctrine, which calls for com pensation only in extreme cases, would tend to yield a systematic ex ploitation of small and relatively less well-off owners, who are ill equipped to protect themselves.
Rejecting a relaxed takings doctrine of minimal compensation, however, does not mean that progressives, being committed to social 3. For the conventional wisdom see, for example, C. Erwin Baker, Property and Its Re lation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 764-65 (1986) (arguing that protection against exploitation may not be best guide for property jurisprudence be cause ban on unjust individual exploitation would necessarily be so broad that it would also prevent desirable government actions); Frank.Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 69 (1997) (arguing that most regulatory restrictions of land use should be perceived as ordinary examples of background risks and opportunities against which we take our chances as own ers of property).
For a recent account of the progressive conception of ownership published after Takings and Distributive Justice, see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF PROPERTY (2000 ).
[Vol. 99:134 responsibility and equality, must subscribe to a libertarian regime that would require full compensation in every case. Libertarians would re quire full compensation every time a taking's impact on one owner is disproportionate to the burden carried by other beneficiaries of that public use. 5 But progressives must reject a regime of full compensation in every case because such a regime would bar any redistribution of society's aggregate resources, wealth, and legal advantages. 6 In addi tion, progressives should be apprehensive about the libertarian strict proportionality rule because it implies that our mutual obligations as citizens are derived solely from either consent or self-advantage. Thus, the strict proportionality regime underplays the significance of be longing, membership, and citizenship, and it therefore undermines so cial responsibility.
A takings doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsibility and equality must therefore avoid both of these extreme positions of uniform no compensation and uniform full compensation. Instead, it should start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advantage: A public action imposing a disproportionate burden is not a taking as long as the immediate burden on the claimant is not extreme, and the claim ant stands to enjoy benefits of similar magnitude from other public ac tions, even if those benefits are not contemporaneous. This conception of reciprocity of advantage attempts to recognize, preserve, and foster the significance of membership and citizenship. At the same time, this approach still cautiously avoids being too utopian about citizenship by acknowledging the detrimental consequences that a no-compensation regime would have in our non-ideal world and, thus, requiring long term rough equivalence of burdens and advantages.7
A further refinement is necessary. An egalitarian takings doctrine must be cautious lest it consistently require disproportionate contribu tions to the community's well-being from owners who are either po litically weak or economically disadvantaged. A government's claim that a citizen should bear a disproportionate burden of a public action based on the citizen's responsibility toward her fellow citizens is not 7. I also noted that localism can be an important component of long-term reciprocity of advantage: "[The] conception of long-term reciprocity requires some distinction between public actions that benefit localities and public actions of larger governmental bodies. In the former category -where the beneficiary of the burden is one's local community -toler ance toward deviations from proportionality is especially warranted." Dagan, supra note 1, at 776. credible if it systematically targets the weaker sectors of society. This concern is especially warranted when the direct beneficiaries of a gov ernment action enjoy significant political or economic power. The egalitarian prong of my proposed takings doctrine addresses these concerns. Where the claimant is weak or disadvantaged, I propose to replace the standard of rough reciprocity of advantage with the more stringent standard of strict proportionality, which then better serves the goals of a progressive takings doctrine.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the socioeconomic status of the claimant should be considered overtly only in extreme cases. In most cases, the egalitarian requirement of a progressive takings regime should be satisfied using a proxy based on the diminution of value test:8 If the diminution of value inflicted by the public action is meas ured against the value of the claimant's affected land as a whole (or her total holdings in the same locality), and the applicable threshold is not set at the extreme positions of either total deprivation or de mini mis reductions, this test yields a built-in disincentive against imposing the public burden on small, politically weak landowners.9
Takings and Distributive Justice demonstrated (perhaps surpris ingly) that considerations of efficiency also support a progressive tak ings regime. 10 A progressive takings law is efficient, I maintained, since 8. My colleague, Professor Roderick Hills, disagrees. He claims that, as a matter of fact, small landowners tend to be politically influential. In contrast, big landowners -developers -in mid-sized American municipalities tend to be politically weak, because their "constitu ents" are non-resident home-buyers who do not vote in municipal elections. Thus, Professor Hills believes that existing takings doctrine gives too much, rather than too little, protection to individual lot owners -overwhelmingly homeowners, whose politics tend to be NIMBY (not in my back yard) politics. By the same token, current doctrine, in his view, does not give enough protection to big developers who usually represent high-density housing, and there fore low-income households.
If these claims are correct, then my proposed doctrine is seriously misguided, as it strengthens the strong and weakens the weak, contrary to its own normative prescriptions. In other words, under these empirical assumptions, the way to implement my call to use takings law to counterbalance disproportional advantages of political influence is through a very different doctrinal test, one that alters the law to protect developers more, because they are the practical proxies for such home-buyers. Cf Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Home owners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) (landowners should have voting power in municipal elections proportionate to their acreage, in order to allow developers to repre sent their buyers by proxy more equally and effectively).
9. Indeed, Takings and Distributive Justice was consciously modest regarding the role that substantive equality can play in takings doctrine. It openly acknowledged "the de manding limitations that planning places on th. e possibility of promoting social justice through Lludge-made) land use law." Dagan, supra note 1, at 779. Accordingly, it focused merely on the attempt to avoid any preferential treatment of the better off. At times, Profes sor Lunney's response ignores this subtlety. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 2, at 417, n.34 and accompanying text.
10. I also maintained that considerations of personality support my progressive test and that it does not unduly hinder the liberty concerns of the better-off. Dagan, supra note 1, at 790. Since Professor Lunney's response focuses on efficiency, I also ignore these other con siderations. Professor Lunney also briefly refers to a concern of "horizontal equity." Lunney, supra note 2, at 413. I have responded to this concern in some detail in my original article and have found it unpersuasive. Dagan, supra note 1, at 788-89.
[Vol. 99:134 it provides proper incentives to both private landowners and public of ficials. Because Professor Lunney's critique does not address my ar guments about private landowners,1 1 I will confine my discussion to public officials.
Assuming that democratic mechanisms make public officials ac countable for budget management, compensation is important to cre ate a budgetary effect that forces governments to internalize the costs that their decisions impose on private resource holders. Without a compensation requirement, public officials might suffer from a "fiscal illusion" as to the true social cost of government action. The need to overcome public officials' "fiscal illusion" applies especially when the injured parties are part of the nonorganized public -where they are "occasional individuals," or where they are members of a marginal group with little political influence. In these cases, in which the risk that public officials will dismiss private costs is acute, compensation may be the only feasible counterbalance. In contrast, in cases in which the public action imposes costs on members of powerful and organized groups, the landowners will probably be able to protect themselves politically, even in the absence of required compensation. Even if a powerful landowner suffers a loss due to the public use, the political system offsets this loss (in many cases) by a quid pro quo elsewhere, either with regard to planning issues or in other matters.
Thus, a uniform nonprogressive compensation regime distorts the incentives of public officials by systematically encouraging them to impose the burden on members of the nonorganized public or on mar ginal groups, even where the best choice, from a planning perspective, would place the burden on members of powerful or organized groups. Only a progressive compensation scheme equalizes the pressures that the public authority faces when selecting the land that will bear a pub lic project, and only a progressive compensation scheme induces the public authority to focus solely on planning considerations.
11. For private landowners, progressive compensation appropriately mediates between two conflicting investment considerations. Compensation is said to be required to prevent underinvestment by risk-averse landowners in their property. However, if the law guaran tees the full value of landowners' investments whenever they could have foreseen the pros pect of a loss in value as the result of a public use, landowners may inefficiently overinvest. Due to the diminishing marginal utility of income, the concern of inefficient underinvest ment by landowners is heightened (and compensation consequently gains in importance) to the extent that the taking affects a more substantial segment of the injured party's estate (all other things being equal). A progressive compensation regime approximates a proper bal ance since it offsets this increased risk of underinvestment by increasing compensation.
Thus, a private homeowner, who is not a professional investor and who has purchased a small parcel of land with her life savings, may be a typical example where full compensation should be required. In contrast, wealthier individuals -and even more so, broadly-held corporations -who own land as part of diversified investment portfolios -are less risk averse. Facing a possibility of an uncompensated investment, they are likely to efficiently adjust their investment decisions commensurate with the risk that their land will be put to public use. For extremely wealthy landowners, the concern of under-investment may not mandate full (or even any) compensation. Professor Lunney discounts the notion that a progressive takings law would generate an effective counterbalance to the lobbying pres sure of powerful groups as "implausible." 15 He analyzes two types of cases and anticipates results opposite to those predicted by my the ory .1 6 First, Professor Lunney discusses cases in which "the govern ment must choose between acting, and thereby imposing a cost on a powerful interest group, and not acting at all." 17 Regarding these "act or abstain" planning decisions, Professor Lunney is not persuaded by my claim that "we need not compensate politically powerful interest groups as readily because their political power will enable them to ex tract compensation through the give-and-take of the legislative proc ess." 18 The political power to block a specific measure, he maintains, may not be convertible to political power elsewhere. Professor Lunney reminds us that political power "is usually contextual and therefore inherently dependent on the position one is taking." 19 Therefore, a "principled opposition" to a proposed government action on the mer its is more effective than "attempted extortion" of compensation.20 If successful, principled opposition would reveal that the proposed ac tion was "undesirable," and would therefore leave no room for any 12. Lunney, supra note 2, _ at 406. 
II. PROFESSOR LUNNEY'S CRITICISMS

Id.
further "log-rolling bargain." 2 1 Only "[a]n up-front promise of com pensation . . . can substantially overcome this public choice prob lem. "2 2
Professor Lunney reaches a similar conclusion regarding cases in which there is a choice between imposing the burden on a relatively powerful and a relatively powerless property-owning group. His claim regarding these cases of placement planning decisions is twofold. As the relative compensation to powerful contingents decreases, he claims, their opposition to the costs of public planning decisions im posed on them "would likely grow stronger and even more strident. "23 By the same token, "as you pay more to the [powerless] landowners, their opposition ... would be reduced. "24 Given these consequences, public planning burdens are more likely to be borne by the less power ful, regardless of efficient planning considerations, thereby increasing the likelihood that the planning authority's decision will be regressive and inefficient. Professor Lunney also maintains that we cannot count on "[t]axpayers and other groups competing for government fund ing" 25 to oppose the higher cost of planning decisions since "[t]hese budget-concerned groups are ... only indirectly affected by the higher [project] cost that progressive compensation may generate" and are thus unlikely to be an effective counterbalance. 26 At best, trying to force effectively unbiased placing decisions through progressive com pensation would result in governmental inaction. The regressive (and inefficient) placement will no longer be affordable; the progressive (and efficient) one "would not be politically viable."2 7
Even if my progressive takings doctrine works as I expect, how ever, Professor Lunney still would not endorse it for three main rea sons. First, the "simpler and more appropriate avenue" of increasing compensation to approximate the landowners' true losses should "tend to quiet" political opposition to placement decisions and thereby achieve my goal. 28 Thus, uniform full compensation encour ages planning authorities "to adopt the efficient, rather than the politi cally-expedient, solution." 29 Funding compensation through progres sive taxation is how Professor Lunney would further the proper distributive goals. Second, a progressive compensation scheme would require courts either to second-guess what constitutes socially optimal planning decisions or to separate legitimate from illegitimate uses of political power on the part of affluent powerful groups and "award progressive compensation in those cases in which it appeared that the illegitimate political power was driving" the project placement deci sion. 30 These determinations -as well as the concept of distributive justice itself -are "the least susceptible to judicial resolution. "31 Thus, Professor Lunney invokes "Lochner's shadow" to warn against the in stitutional difficulties my theory raises. Finally, while Professor Lunney does not dispute the value of social responsibility and civic vir tue, he insists that "these, like all virtues, come from within and cannot be forced by legal rules." 32 A progressive takings regime may force property owners "to give up their property ... for the sake of the com munity," but it can never make them "more virtuous or more respon sible." 33 Professor Lunney also presents an alternative to progressive tak ings.34 His interpretation of the Compensation Clause focuses on "whether the government has acted in a manner to deprive the very few of a property interest for the sake of the very many." 35 Requiring compensation in such instances would "eliminate the few's opposition to the measure and thereby improve the legislature's ability both to evaluate the proposed action's merits and to go forward should action prove desirable." 36 Thus, "a uniform few-many test, together with something closer to 'true loss' compensation awards, would achieve the same distributive justice goals if funded through progressive taxa tion" and it "would prove better able to overcome the efficiency con cerns associated with takings." 37 [Vol. 99:134 reedy, Professor Lunney has no normative quarrel with social respon sibility and equality (although he believes that social responsibility cannot be promoted by law). Moreover, we both agree that a proper regime should neutralize, as much as possible, any biased (non planning) considerations from the planning authority's decision. We differ, however, as to which regime would do the job.
Ill. THE INCENTIVES OF PROGRESSIVE COMPENSATION A. Public Choice and Public Reason
In discussing this question, I want to use Professor Lunney's help ful refinement of traditional public choice analysis. Most such analyses (including mine, in my original article) conceptualize interest groups' influence only in terms of their wealth, power, and comparative ad vantage in acting collectively (the "collective action comparative ad vantage"). Professor Lunney resists this reductionist strategy. He in sists that political power is contextual and, more importantly, dependent upon one's position and one's arguments -that the plau sibility, and even persuasiveness, of an interest group's lobbying ef forts must be taken into account in considering its ultimate influence.38 Professor Lunney's refinement on this front seems to me persua sive. Injecting normativity into the public choice analysis is important and valuable. It (implicitly) helps mediate between two accounts of government action. 39 One account understands the government to act as a buffer between conflicting interests and to aggregate their respec tive pressures. Another, much more sanguine, account sees the gov ernment as a loyal servant of the public interest. Each of these ac counts has been the subject of some criticism. The former accountpublic choice theory -is said to undervalue the constraints that pub lic reason imposes on legislative (or administrative) action; thus, it is accused for being positively inaccurate and normatively nihilist. 40 The latter account -public interest theory -is criticized for disregarding the influence of parochial interest groups; thus, it is portrayed as ro mantic, naive, and frequently -given our non-ideal world in which such influence is prevalent -counterproductive. 41 As I understand it, Professor Lunney's framework transcends this divide. It acknowledges the reality of influences based on wealth, power, and collective action 38. Traditional public choice analysis may present this point as the need to consider the relative abilities of interest groups to mobilize votes. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 114 (2000 ). While this point is indeed familiar, I think that the way Professor Lunney recasts it is valuable. As the text below explains, Professor Lunney's formulation focuses the inquiry on the normative power of an interest group's reasons. Thus, the reformulation (implicitly) highlights the importance of the prevalent social meanings that ultimately determine this normative power. I happily endorse this account, which ignores neither material in centives nor social meanings. I believe, however, that my takings the ory, building on incentives and social meanings, is improved rather than challenged by using this richer understanding of government.
B. "Act or Abstain" Planning Decisions I believe that the specific conclusion Professor Lunney draws from this framework to the takings context is misguided. Professor Lunney believes that, given the importance of reasons, an interest group's ef forts to resist an undesirable public measure must be understood in the binary terms of success (blocking the measure) or failure. There fore, in his view, there is (almost) no possibility of translating that group's political influence into any type of compensation because the group's justifications for blocking the measure are inapplicable to any other context. Thus, only a legal entitlement to full compensation can help neutralize the potentially distorting pressure of strong interest groups.
This conclusion is premised on the view that once an objection to a project is formulated as a commodified claim for a quid pro quo, it loses all value. This view, however, is implausible for two reasons. [Vol. 99:134 tarian exploitation -can be just as principled as one targeting the de sirability of the proposed government action. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that such an argument would not gain, if perceived to be correct, at least as much sympathy and normative power. 44 Because a complaint against the distribution of a project's costs can be just as normatively powerful as a complaint against the proj ect's social desirability, and because the non-normative bases of the power of interest groups are, in any event, also significant, it is reason able to conclude -contrary to Professor Lunney's objection -that power asserted (albeit unsuccessfully) to block a public measure can be translated into power to extract in-kind compensation if the pro posed project does go forward. 45 Hence, Professor Lunney is wrong in claiming that only a legal entitlement to compensation can overcome interest group objections where the government's choice is imposing the cost on such a group or not acting at all. 46
C. Placement Planning Decisions
Consider now the other type of case, in which the planning authority faces a choice of placement respecting a given public action. Professor Lunney believes that a progressive takings law tends to pro duce either regressive placement decisions or government inaction. But again his analysis is flawed. Professor Lunney's first argument on this point is that, as the rela tive compensation to powerful contingents decreases, "their opposi tion ... would likely grow stronger and even more strident."4 7 He seems to be aware that -compared to the current state of the law - This statement seems to follow our shared premise regarding the im pact of the justificatory power of reasons on an interest group's power.
It assumes that a progressive takings law is unfair and thus concludes that the influence of an affluent contingency opposing a measure un der such a regime would be stronger than its influence under current rules.
Professor Lunney's assumption, however, begs the question. I cer tainly agree that, other things being equal, opposition to a patently un fair measure is frequently more powerful than opposition to a fair measure. But a progressive takings regime is not patently unfair. On the contrary, this regime vindicates -better than Professor Lunney's uniform few-many test (as Part IV shows) -the values of social re sponsibility and equality. Hence, insofar as social responsibility and equality are -or will become -respectable public reasons under a progressive compensation regime, there is no reason to believe that a legal regime that relies on these values would be especially vulnerable to interest group fairness challenges. Professor Lunney's second argument in support of the claim that a progressive takings law would generate regressive placement decisions is that such a regime would reduce the opposition of weaker landown ers to placement decisions that hurt them. It may be true that the prospect of greater compensation would somewhat increase compla cency among such groups, but this impact is likely to be rather mini mal. As Professor Lunney himself admits, compensation under current law is far from being complete. 49 (It notably does not cover subjective losses. 50 ) Thus, even when "just compensation" is granted, a claimant 48. Id. at 409 n.20. 49. Id. at 406. Nevertheless, Professor Lunney "defines" just compensation as that level of compensation that makes landowners indifferent. Id. at 412 n.26. 50. Good economic reasons exist for the law's choice not to cover subjective (nonpecu niary) losses. Recall that compensation is a kind of insurance, for which all citizens pay (by a tax increase). Conventional economic wisdom says that people are generally not interested in purchasing insurance for nonpecuniary losses because the extra money they will get can not, by definition, restore the irreplaceable good that they lost. Thus, taxpayers do not value the compensation for the nonpecuniary fraction of their losses in cases of takings more than the money lost in the tax increase. (Notice, however, that although potential takings victims do not want insurance-compensation ex ante, they will still -as the text below claimswant increased compensation ex post in order to minimize their nonpecuniary losses.) See, [Vol. 99:134 can hardly be expected to remain indifferent between compensation and the loss inflicted by the public action at issue. Professor Lunney is aware of this difficulty and therefore advocates "something closer to 'true loss' compensation awards."5 1 This response, however, is inade quate. The problem is not only with certain doctrinal faults that can be easily reformed. Rather, undercompensation is inherent in the takings scenario: "Both transaction costs and subjective preferences may lead landowners to prefer the status quo -which .includes the possibility of voluntary realization -to the forced transfer of their proprietary rights against the fair market value thereof,"5 2 however calculated. Therefore, no technical reform of the just compensation formula is likely to satisfy disgruntled landowners sufficiently that they lose in terest in lobbying to shift the impact of a public project to other peo ple's land.
Finally, Professor Lunney maintains that if we tried to force the proper placement of the public project through progressive compensa tion, the likely result would be governmental inaction because budget ary constraints would make placement on the land of weaker owners impossible, while political concerns would preclude building the proj ect on the land of the more powerful landowners.53 This conclusion is untenable: First, as I indicated above, progressive compensation would not make powerful landowners' resistance to disadvantageous siting decisions much more zealous and vociferous. Furthermore, Professor Lunney's conclusion discounts (or ignores) the fact that invariably, in such situations, some additional pressure will come from the commu nity that needs the project at hand.5 4 The community will also be able to marshal normatively powerful arguments in favor of the planning decision. Finally, because the compensation accorded to the less afflu ent is never higher than the diminution of the fair market value of their land, there is no basis for Professor Lunney's claim that progres- 54. This argument depends on the assumption that the community that needs the proj ect can organize to support it. The extent or intensity of this additional pressure will obvi ously vary, depending in part on the ability of the benefited group to organize to support the project. Despite potential collective action problems, however, it would not be unreasonable to assume that this additional pressure would be considerable if the proposed project were indeed socially beneficial. sive compensation will make project sitings on the land of the less af fluent prohibitively expensive.ss * * *
In contrast to Professor Lunney's arguments, progressive compen sation would not increase the effective opposition of strong interest groups, and it would not significantly decrease the opposition of weaker landowners. It will work -as intended -as a legal pressure that increases the cost of placing a project in a way that harms the powerless. Contrary to Professor Lunney's claim, the higher price tag on taking less affluent properties does not "introduce an artificial bias" that may distort unbiased siting decisions.56 Rather, this mecha nism works to counterbalance an already-extant bias in the systemthe heightened political power of affluent groups -so that planning considerations can once again become the focus of the siting decision. It is, admittedly, difficult to figure out how much legal pressure is required neatly and exactly to neutralize the non-planning lobbying pressures of such strong interest groups. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that the absence of countervailing legal pressure does not generate the "efficient, rather than the politically expedient, solution," as Professor Lunney implies.5 7 Rather, any nonprogressive regime, in cluding Professor Lunney's proposed few-many· rule, generates place ment decisions that are biased in favor of strong landowners and are 55. The main example Professor Lunney uses to show the inferiority of my progressive compensation proposal in the placement planning decisions scenario is the Watts Freeway Project. He claims that the unfortunate placement of the freeway resulted from the fact that Just Compensation law does not fully compensate, so the more affluent landowners' opposi tion simply drowned out the poorer landowners' objections due to their heightened political, economic, and social power. Lunney, supra note 2, at 404-06. However, the Watts Freeway case may actually illustrate that a uniform full compensation rule will invariably push the burdens of planning decisions on the less well-off simply because the price tag will always be lower. Pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Poli cies Act § § 4601 et seq., whenever a government project displaces a property owner, the head of the displacing agency must reimburse the displaced owner for the actual and reasonable moving expenses and loss of personal property. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4622. In cases of residen tial displacement, the government must also pay the reasonable cost of replacement dwelling in cases where reimbursement alone is insufficient to cover this expense, any debt service costs required to finance replacement housing, and any reasonable expenses incurred for evidence of title, recording fees, and any other costs incident to the replacement housing purchase. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4623(a). Subject to the inherent, unresolvable difficulties of any compensation scheme, discussed supra note 52 and accompanying text, this formula very nearly approximates "full compensation." And, following precisely the predictions of my theory, at least one of the reasons cited by the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency for their decision to run the highway through Watts and Compton rather than nearer to downtown in the Beverly Hills area was that relocation in the former area was es timated to cost only $50,000 per unit, while relocation in the more expensive areas was esti mated to cost almost twice that. [Vol. 99:134 thus systematically both regressive and (from a purely planning view point) sub-optimal. Only a progressive compensation scheme im proves on -although imprecisely and probably still imperfectly58 -these undesirable outcomes.59
IV. THE SOCIAL MEANING OF PROGRESSIVE COMPENSATION
In the conclusion of his response, Professor Lunney raises doubts as to the propriety of my attempt to promote social responsibility and civic virtue through law. Desirable they are, he admits, but he still claims that "these, like all virtues, come from within and cannot be forced by legal rules." 60 A progressive takings law may generate desir able material results, "[b]ut we should not make the mistake of think ing that we have thereby made [the affected] landowners more virtu ous or more responsible. We have simply set the stage for them to make absolutely certain that someone else will have the pleasure of experiencing 'civic virtue' the next time." 61
This response fails to appreciate the expressive role of rights -in our context, the right to property -in constitutional adjudication. It further undervalues the intricate ways in which legal discourse affects social meanings. Finally, it paradoxically undermines the importance of Professor Lunney's own insight regarding the interaction between power and reasons in the way interest groups influence outcomes.
In characterizing the expressive role of rights, Professor Pildes re cently explained that "[r]ights are not general trumps against appeals to the common good," 62 as they are sometimes mistakenly conceptu alized. Rather, in actual constitutional practice, rights "serve as tech nical means for bringing into court these issues involving the constitu tional conception of various common goods." 63 Properly understood, 58. Indeed, in some cases, as Professor Lunney claims, increased relative compensation to less well-off property owners may push the cost of imposing the planning decision on the less well-off higher than the cost of imposing it on the wealthy, even when choosing the land of the less well-off owners is more efficient. Id. at 414 n.29. But there is no reason to believe that this effect will be particularly frequent. And there is certainly no reason to think that this imperfection outweighs the regressive distortions of a uniform compensation scheme.
59. At one point, Professor Lunney almost concedes my claim that less compensation would ensure unbiased placement decisions. He admits that a reduced compensation scheme may be needed to compensate for disproportionately vocal lobbying groups. Id. at 412 n.27 (relating to "the road contractors' pro-road influence"). This concession admits that in creased compensation to less affluent and powerful groups is appropriate to counterbalance the non-planning-related pressures that the affluent are able to bring to bear on planning decisions. 60. Id. at 425.
Id.
62 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998).
Id. at 744.
rights discourse is a means to "constrain the kind of reasons that gov ernment can act on when it seeks to regulate or intervene in some sphere of activity." 64 Rights discourse enables courts "to attend to the expressive dimensions of governmental action," policing its corre spondence to "collective interests and structural concerns." 65
Takings and Distributive Justice fits within this expressive frame work. 66 This interpretation suggests that the Compensation Clause is devoted to realizing not only the common good of individual liberty but also other common goods: social responsibility and equality. In corporating this multitude of common goods into the meaning of the constitutional right to property redefines the scope of legitimate gov ernment intervention. I have already addressed in the previous Part the direct material consequences of this doctrine, but it is significant to appreciate its expressive dimension as well. A progressive takings law is a symbolic public expression of our bonds of concern and solidarity with others, a political reaffirmation of the importance that we attach to social responsibility and civic virtue. 67
Moreover, this expressive dimension is likely to generate cultural consequences that may feed back into the direct material conse quences of the doctrine. The social meaning of the right to propertythe common goods we believe this right is meant to realize -defines the realm of normatively powerful objections to government action, as well as the realm of objections that we tend to perceive as merely self centered, and thus publicly inconsequential. More precisely, as I claim in the remainder of this Part, incorporating a progressive conception of property into takings law is likely to affect the normative power of the claims raised by the parties in a way that reinforces the outcomes intended by the progressive takings doctrine.
It is important not to overstate the claim of the normative influ ence of takings law: I do not believe that the doctrinal details of tak ings law, or of any other branch of the law, for that matter, directly shape people's values and preferences -obviously not the prefer ences and values of those it immediately regulates. The possible cul tural consequences of takings law are more subtle in at least two senses.
First, "what may affect people's preferences and values are not specific doctrinal rules (of which they are usually unaware), but rather, the more fundamental legal concepts and institutions. Thus, in our 64. Id. at 731 (emphasis added). [Vol. 99:134 case, I do not claim that the specific contours of the compensation re gime of takings law have any expressive function." 68 Rather, I claim that, given its prominence and popular visibility, "takings doctrine may have significant ramifications on our conception of ownership, and that ownership -a concept of popular use that is legally con structed -may affect people's preferences and values." 69 In other words, my proposed theory expresses a progressive approach to own ership that internalizes civic virtues and egalitarian concerns about dis tribution into the concept of property. And it is by vindicating this progressive understanding of ownership that a progressive takings law may help reshape our vision of our responsibilities as owners, our ex pectations of owners, and the limits of what we perceive to be the le gitimate interests of owners. 70
Second, even the more fundamental legal concepts and institutions -in our case, ownership -do not directly affect the preferences and values of the people they regulate. Rather, because people's decisions are "based in part on their perception of the values, beliefs, and be havior of other individuals," doctrines that affect the social meaning of fundamental legal concepts and institutions -such as the rules that determine our understanding of ownership -exert social influences that eventually affect the regulated subjects. 7 1
Even considering these two caveats, critics -such as Professor Lunney -may be alarmed by any reference to the value-shaping function of law. The concern is typically twofold. First, one should not "assume too readily that the government will exercise this [function] in a benign fashion." 72 Second, legal intervention "may weaken, rather than foster, an individual's capacity for moral choice" by converting moral action to one induced by "the individual's selfish desire to avoid law's sanction." 73 68. Dagan, supra note 1, at 791 n.177. 69. Id. airly huge outcomes will turn on whether we attribute continued vitality to the unqualified exclusory function of 'property' or choose instead to fashion our property thinking to accord with more inclusive, more inte grative visions of social relationship.").
A cautious attitude toward governmental action is always war ranted. 7 4 But notice that the caution about law's stance towards fun damental moral choices does not apply merely with respect to legal regimes that attempt to promote other-regarding values. Rather, it applies, and with identical force, with regard to libertarian legal re gimes. As an important social institution, law cannot avoid affectingin the modest sense described above -popular consciousness.7 5 Therefore, the question is not whether law should be in the business of affecting values, but rather which values law should promote. 76 To be sure, there are cases in which law's coerciveness indeed un dermines its normativity. Where the goals or the means of a legal norm are overly ambitious vis-a-vis people's preexisting preferences, they are perceived as unreasonable, maybe even offensive.77 In such cases, law is devoid of any normative impact. Its recipients, like Holmes' bad man, respond solely to its sanctions. 78 But the progressive takings doctrine I propose does not fall into this trap. It is consciously modest respecting the disproportionality of the burden imposed in the name of social responsibility. Moreover, it justifies the denial of compensation only if such burden is likely to be offset by benefits of similar magnitude. Finally, the material impact of my proposed doctrine would be to increase the level of compensation granted to powerless landowners without decreasing the compensation afforded to affluent landowners. Thus, progressive takings law, as I understand it, does not eliminate people's capacity to make moral choices voluntarily. Consequently, it does not reduce the moral worth of human action.7 9
Having these refinements in mind, it is significant that Professor such a settlement constituted a taking, 86 Justice Powell noted in con currence that, "[t]he Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by a [sic] relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts." 8 7 Lower courts have followed Justice Powell's theory that compensatory claims with which a government has interfered are "property interests" for takings purposes, and have accordingly scrutinized the constitutionality of such governmental in terferences. 88
The leading case in this context is Shanghai Power v. Un ited States. 89 An American corporation sought compensation for its lost claim against China resulting from China's confiscation of the com pany's power plant in Shanghai. The President extinguished all out standing claims against China in the process of establishing diplomatic relations, and the company's portion of the settlement, about $20 mil lion, was far less than the company's claim of $144 million. 90 Judge Kozinski concluded that there was no compensable taking. First, al though the company did bear a disproportionate loss in the short term, there was no radical disproportionality; the company did recover some amount of its losses. Second, the court noted that the President's abil ity to establish good relations with foreign nations was what made for eign trade and travel for Americans and American corporations possi ble. 91 In the long-term, the company stood to benefit as a long-term trader, and thus no compensation was necessary notwithstanding the short-term disproportionate loss.
This case vividly demonstrates the applicability of my progressive theory in a nonland context. The considerations raised by Judge Kozinski for denying compensation nicely mirror my proposed inter pretation of the reciprocity of advantage test: Long-term reciprocity suffices to deny compensation, even where the immediate burden sus tained by the claimant is clearly disproportionate. Moreover, because the company was a strong business entity able to fend for itself in ne gotiating with the government, this case does not present any egali tarian concerns that would have justified a stricter proportionality analysis. 94 We also show that, even absent such direct curtailment of citizens' claims, there may be some indirect evidence -the States' receipt of industry payments in excess of their preventive and ameliorative costs and their spending of such funds on causes that have nothing to do with the in jured citizens' interests -that the tobacco settlement may sacrifice the interests of injured citizens. 9 5 92. Professor Lunney's discussion of Penn Central may imply this response to my analy sis of Shanghai Power. Even if the beneficial public action was not blocked, progressive compensation may still have generated heightened opposition costs that are socially undesir able. However, as I explain above, the claim that progressive compensation generates exces sive opposition costs is unconvincing. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. Can injured smokers invoke the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend ments if these concerns tum out to be true? 96 Do such governmental interferences with citizens' compensatory claims justify compensa tion? 97 Professor Lunney's test seems to suggest a negative answer, since the potential claimants -the injured smokers -are many and dispersed. 98 They are of the "occasional individual" type, part of the nonorganized public. They have no specific political influence that poses a threat to beneficial public actions involving a curtailment of their interests. Hence, compensation is not required to buy their coop eration.
Professor White and I, however, give the exact opposite answer to this question. In our view, governmental interference with the legal claims of injured citizens in the name of the public good cannot be deemed just unless it is accompanied by compensation.
To see why, consider again the doctrine I advanced in Takings and Distributive Justice.99 It is not sufficient, under the progressive ap proach to takings, to show disproportionality between the benefits ac cruing to the injured smokers through the tobacco settlement and the harm they suffer insofar as the settlement interferes with their com pensatory claims against the industry. The key lies again in the re quirement of long-term reciprocity. This requirement insists that probable, and not merely theoretical, reciprocity take place. The mere fact of the owner's membership in the benefited community cannot be of enough advantage to offset a tangible disproportionate loss. Long term reciprocity further safeguards against too extreme a transient imbalance by disallowing overly excessive private burdens. In the case of the tobacco settlement, this requirement patently fails to obtain. 98. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Tak ings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 433, 440-41 (1995) ("courts should focus on whether government has: (i) changed or restricted property rights that are (ii) of significant value only to a very few to benefit the very many .... If such singling out has not occurred, then a court should allow the government to impose the rights change without compensating the adversely affected property holders" (emphasis added)); see also id. at 497-98 (same).
99. Other approaches to takings also reach similar conclusions. Dagan & White, supra note 93, at 415.
The egalitarian concerns of my progressive takings doctrine further bolster this conclusion. In order to see why, we do not need to second guess the socially optimal decision or to separate legitimate from ille gitimate political power, as Professor Lunney's Lochner-ism line of critique maintains. Rather, it is enough for us to evaluate the political power of the claimants, an evaluation which is surprisingly similar to the questions Professor Lunney's theory asks us to address.
Whereas the inquiry my theory requires is analogous to the inquiry needed under Professor Lunney's theory, our conclusions are strik ingly contradictory. In my view, the fact that the (many and dispersed) injured smokers are devoid of any political clout supports -rather than undermines -the urgency of compensation. Without a strong constitutional guarantee, the interests of injured citizens may easily be disregarded, and public officials may use their compensatory damages for more politically-visible purposes. Neither distributive justice nor efficiency is promoted by inducing these perverse incentives.
CONCLUSION
Professor Lunney helpfully advances the public choice analysis of takings law by insisting that the social persuasiveness of interest groups' claims, and not only their wealth, power, and collective action comparative advantage, determines their impact on public decisions. This insight highlights the significance of the social meaning of the constitutional right to property, which is, in turn, affected by the way society shapes takings law. Hence, this refined public choice analysis requires us to interject the evaluation of these cultural consequences of takings law into the more directly material consequences of our doctrinal alternatives.
Taking these implications seriously bolsters, rather than frustrates, the progressive approach to takings. Professor Lunney's response em phasizes the significance of my proposal to graft social responsibility and equality onto takings law. It also reinforces, rather than under mines, my argument that takings doctrine must supply an effective counterbalance to the "natural" power disparity in society in order to ensure unbiased governmental decisions.
